This guest editorial is by Dan Marasco, Director, Commercial Supply Chain, Biogen.
Pharma has mastered measuring CDMO performance. It’s time we measured the partnership itself. True strategic relationships go beyond contracts, cost, and KPIs. They require mutual accountability, measurable trust, shared incentives, and a commitment to each other’s success throughout the product lifecycle. The next frontier isn’t extracting more value from each other. It’s creating more value together, with reliable patient supply as the ultimate measure of success.
The illusion of partnership
Somewhere inside nearly every pharmaceutical company is a presentation identifying its strategic suppliers. Somewhere inside nearly every contract development and manufacturing organization (CDMO) is another presentation identifying its strategic customers. Both presentations probably contain the same vocabulary: trust, transparency, collaboration, innovation, alignment, and long-term commitment. Yet when a manufacturing line fails, a forecast changes, or a product’s commercial trajectory disappoints, those carefully chosen words can disappear remarkably quickly. The sponsor points to the supply agreement. The CDMO points to the forecast. Procurement invokes contractual remedies. Operations demands recovery dates. Senior executives, who may not have spoken in months, suddenly convene an escalation meeting. And everyone wonders what happened to the partnership. Perhaps the more uncomfortable question is whether a partnership existed in the first place.
At CDMO Live Americas in Boston, I participated in the strategic procurement panel, where we explored five deceptively simple questions:
- What does a strategic relationship require from each side?
- How do we write contracts that reward the right behavior?
- Can something as intangible as trust be measured?
- What does it mean to be a good customer?
- And how do we end a relationship without destroying the value it created?
These are not merely procurement questions. They are questions about how organizations distribute responsibility, manage uncertainty, and behave when their interests no longer align perfectly. After nearly three decades working across pharmaceutical procurement, strategic sourcing, and external manufacturing operations, I have become convinced of one thing: A strategic relationship is not defined by the contract, the spending, or the label. It is defined by the behavior of both organizations when doing the right thing becomes difficult.
1. What does a strategic relationship actually require?
The word strategic has become dangerously elastic. A supplier might be considered strategic because it represents substantial spend, manufactures a high-revenue product, possesses specialized technology, or cannot easily be replaced. Those characteristics certainly make a supplier important. They do not necessarily make it a strategic partner.
We need to distinguish two concepts that are frequently confused. Tier 1 is a classification of business importance. Strategic partnership is a relationship earned through behavior. A company can be heavily dependent on a CDMO that it neither trusts nor particularly enjoys working with. That supplier may be critical, but dependency should never be mistaken for partnership.
I would define a genuinely strategic relationship through five dimensions:
- Business criticality. The importance of the products, manufacturing complexity, technical capabilities, supply risk, switching difficulty, and future portfolio opportunities.
- Operational excellence. Consistent delivery against quality, right-first-time (RFT), on-time-in-full (OTIF), cost, continuous improvement, and supply commitments.
- Mutual commitment and flexibility. A willingness to invest in capability, accommodate changing business requirements, and remain engaged throughout the product lifecycle, including periods of declining demand.
- Trust and constructive challenge. Transparent communication, early identification of risks, and the willingness to respectfully disagree.
- Strategic alignment and governance. Shared objectives, appropriate executive engagement, clear accountability, and a deliberate commitment to improving the relationship.
Trust and constructive challenge deserve particular attention. The best CDMO is not necessarily the one that says yes most often. Sometimes the most valuable response a sponsor can receive is a well-reasoned no. A CDMO that challenges an unrealistic forecast, questions an aggressive timeline, or raises concerns about manufacturing readiness may be demonstrating greater commitment than one that enthusiastically accepts every request. The question is whether the sponsor has created an environment in which that honesty is welcomed.
There is also a fundamental economic tension that neither party should ignore. Pharma wants flexibility. CDMOs want predictable utilization. Sponsors want competitive pricing. CDMOs need acceptable returns on capital. Sponsors want capacity available when needed. CDMOs cannot indefinitely reserve expensive assets without a credible economic rationale.
Strategic partnership does not eliminate these conflicts. It creates a mechanism for resolving them without destroying the relationship. That requires mutual investment, but mutual investment does not always mean equal financial contributions. One party may contribute capital while the other contributes volume visibility, technical expertise, commercial commitment, or faster decision-making. The essential requirement is that both parties contribute something meaningful and receive something valuable.
And commitment must survive the full product lifecycle. It is easy to celebrate partnership when volumes are growing and new business is being awarded. The more revealing test comes when forecasts decline, a product matures, or the sponsor has no new projects to offer. Does the CDMO maintain the same discipline and attention? Does the sponsor communicate the change early enough for the CDMO to adjust? If commitment exists only during growth, it is not strategic. It is conditional enthusiasm.
2. How do we write contracts that reward the right behavior?
Consider a familiar situation. A sponsor negotiates aggressively for lower unit pricing, tight delivery commitments, limited forecast flexibility, and significant penalties for underperformance. The resulting contract looks attractive on a procurement savings report. But what behaviors has it encouraged? Perhaps the CDMO becomes reluctant to reserve flexible capacity. Perhaps it prioritizes more profitable customers. Perhaps it avoids complex, low-volume products. Perhaps it becomes cautious about investing in improvements whose benefits accrue almost entirely to the sponsor. The sponsor has negotiated a lower price while potentially increasing its total supply risk.
A contract is not merely a legal document. It is an incentive system. And every incentive system teaches people what matters. Traditional agreements are often exceptionally detailed about failure. They define penalties, liability, service levels, remedies, and termination rights. Far fewer are equally thoughtful about rewarding sustained excellence. What if we applied the same creativity to success?
Reward performance over time. OTIF and RFT should be fundamental expectations, not opportunities to collect a bonus for every successful batch. However, sustained exceptional performance across an agreed measurement period could justify an incentive, provided quality, compliance, and patient safety remain nonnegotiable. The distinction matters. We should reward durable operating excellence, not isolated good outcomes or metrics that can be manipulated.
Share the value of productivity improvements. Suppose a joint technical initiative improves manufacturing yield, reduces waste, or shortens cycle time. Why should the financial benefit automatically belong entirely to one party? A gainsharing arrangement can establish a baseline, define the method for calculating verified improvements, and allocate benefits according to an agreed formula. Both organizations then have a financial reason to identify and implement improvements. The same logic can apply to equipment efficiency, changeover reduction, packaging optimization, and selected process improvements.
Consider yield banking with appropriate safeguards. One concept worth exploring is yield banking. When a CDMO consistently exceeds an agreed yield baseline, a portion of the verified economic value could be credited toward future commercial performance adjustments. This would not excuse quality failures, regulatory noncompliance, or poor manufacturing practices. Nor should it allow the CDMO to conceal an adverse trend. It would simply recognize that manufacturing performance is best evaluated over time rather than through isolated events.
Exchange flexibility for commitment. Capacity is not free. If sponsors require preferential access, surge capability, or reserved manufacturing slots, the commercial model should recognize the cost of maintaining that flexibility. Equally, CDMOs should consider whether investment can be supported through broader portfolio commitments, transparent demand planning, or shared commercial benefits rather than automatically requiring rigid take-or-pay provisions. The goal is not to eliminate risk, but to allocate risk to the party best positioned to manage it and reward that party appropriately.
There is a useful distinction between negotiating hard and negotiating intelligently. Hard negotiation maximizes the immediate concession. Intelligent negotiation asks what behaviors the resulting agreement will produce over the next five or ten years. I sometimes compare a supply agreement to a prenuptial agreement. You absolutely need a good one. It should be carefully negotiated, clearly written, and protect both parties. If you find yourself reaching for it every time there is a disagreement, the relationship is probably not particularly healthy. The contract establishes the rules. The relationship determines how the business actually operates.
3. Can we measure something as intangible as trust?
Pharmaceutical manufacturing is an industry of extraordinary measurement. We measure yield, deviations, batch release, inventory, schedule adherence, cycle time, and financial performance. We build dashboards with increasingly sophisticated visualizations yet we often neglect a potentially important indicator of how organizations will behave under pressure: the quality of the relationship itself.
Some introspective questions:
- How much do we trust one another?
- Can difficult news be communicated without fear of disproportionate retaliation?
- Do commitments made in governance meetings translate into action?
- Are disagreements resolved constructively?
- Does each organization believe the other acts in good faith?
These questions may sound subjective, but subjective does not mean irrelevant and it certainly does not mean immeasurable. I believe strategic sponsor–CDMO relationships should incorporate a periodic, structured, two-way 360-degree relationship-health assessment. Both organizations should evaluate the relationship across dimensions such as strategic alignment, corporate compatibility, governance effectiveness, trust and commitment, communication quality, resource allocation, operating controls, value delivery, cost management, and fairness in the allocation of risk and reward. The findings can be displayed in a simple radar or spider chart, with the sponsor’s perceptions alongside the CDMO’s. The most valuable information may not be the absolute scores.
It may be the differences between the two organizations’ perceptions. Imagine the sponsor rates communication at nine out of ten while the CDMO rates it at five. That discrepancy deserves investigation. Perhaps the sponsor believes its frequent emails demonstrate engagement. The CDMO experiences those same communications as conflicting requests from Procurement, Quality, Technical Operations, Planning, and Regulatory Affairs. Both sides may sincerely believe they are communicating effectively. Obviously, examine the areas where both parties rate low.
The survey may expose a problem that neither conventional OTIF nor RFT metrics would reveal. But there are important limitations. A relationship survey should not become another supplier grading exercise. Responses should be sufficiently candid, gathered from multiple functions, and discussed without punishment or defensiveness. Scores should be tracked over time and paired with concrete examples and corrective actions. A high trust score does not prove that a relationship is healthy. A low score does not necessarily mean the supplier is failing. The assessment is a diagnostic instrument, not a scientific verdict. Most importantly, the sponsor must accept that the CDMO may identify shortcomings in the sponsor’s own organization. That is not an unfortunate side effect. It is the point. A relationship cannot be considered genuinely strategic if only one party is allowed to evaluate the other.
Governance must precede the crisis. Effective partnerships require operational meetings, periodic business reviews, clear escalation mechanisms, and executive-level strategic discussions. For truly strategic relationships, I favor top-to-top engagement once or twice a year, even when performance is strong. Senior executives should discuss portfolio direction, technology investment, capacity strategy, future risks, and opportunities for joint value creation. The first time two companies’ senior leaders meet should not be during a major supply interruption. If executive governance exists only to manage emergencies, it is not strategic governance. It is emergency management.
4. What does it take to be a good customer?
This may be the most uncomfortable question for pharmaceutical sponsors. We invest substantial resources in evaluating CDMOs. We audit their facilities, assess their financial condition, review quality systems, scrutinize costs, and demand increasingly sophisticated performance metrics. But how often do we ask a simpler question?
Why should this CDMO want us as a customer? A sponsor may be commercially attractive because of its size, reputation, or portfolio. That does not automatically make it easy or desirable to work with. Does the sponsor provide reliable forecasts? Are purchase orders issued on time? Are invoices paid promptly? Do technical decisions move quickly? Do Quality, Procurement, External Manufacturing, and Supply Chain communicate a consistent set of priorities? Does the sponsor recognize the cost of frequent schedule changes? When the CDMO raises a legitimate concern, is the response collaborative or punitive? These are not minor administrative matters. They directly influence the cost, efficiency, and predictability of the manufacturing relationship. A sponsor that creates operational chaos should not be surprised when its CDMO struggles to deliver operational excellence.
The same principle applies to relationships inherited through acquisitions, organizational restructuring, or leadership changes. It is tempting to accept the previous team’s assessment of a supplier as fact. But relationships carry history, personalities, grievances, and sometimes considerable baggage. A new leader should begin with a relationship inventory: listen to both organizations, understand the economics and operating history, identify unresolved issues, and establish a shared view of what needs to change. One person’s departure or arrival can sometimes transform a relationship. That should remind us that this is ultimately a people business.
When a CDMO fails, whose problem is it? There is an organizational inconsistency that deserves more attention. When a major quality or manufacturing problem occurs at an internal pharmaceutical plant, the organization often mobilizes substantial resources. Technical Operations, Quality, Engineering, Regulatory Affairs, Supply Chain, and senior leadership may become directly involved. Expert teams are assembled. Travel budgets are approved. Specialized resources are redirected. The problem is treated as an enterprise priority.
Yet when a comparable issue occurs at an external manufacturing site, the response can be remarkably different. The sponsor demands updates, escalates through governance, and reminds the CDMO of its contractual obligations. But where is the technical support? Where is the shared problem-solving? Where is the sense of collective responsibility? Of course, the CDMO must remain accountable for its operations and quality systems. Sponsors should not interfere unnecessarily or assume control of activities for which they are not responsible. But when patient supply is at risk, the sponsor’s obligation should extend beyond asking when the problem will be fixed. Sometimes the right response is a daily technical review. Sometimes it is a person-in-plant. Sometimes it is a small, highly capable cross-functional recovery team.
The guiding principle should be straightforward: Don’t send ten people asking when the problem will be fixed. Send two people who can help fix it. The language we use reveals our mindset. When an internal site experiences a serious problem, we say, we have a problem. When a CDMO experiences a problem, we sometimes say, they have a problem. But if patients cannot receive their medicines, the distinction becomes meaningless. The supply chain has failed regardless of who owns the manufacturing equipment. This is the real test of partnership: not whether we share credit when things go well, but whether we share responsibility when things go poorly.
Strategic does not mean exclusive. Being a good customer does not require abandoning competition. CDMOs should continue to earn business through performance, technical capability, competitiveness, and value. Sponsors should maintain appropriate alternatives where patient criticality and supply risk justify them. Dual sourcing, however, is neither free nor universally practical. Additional sources introduce qualification costs, technical complexity, inventory implications, and ongoing operating expenses. The decision should be risk-based. A strategic CDMO can coexist with competitive alternatives. What undermines the relationship is not competition itself, but the constant use of competition as a threat. Competition can create discipline. Weaponizing competition destroys trust.
5. How do you end a strategic relationship well?
Every business relationship eventually changes. Products mature. Volumes decline. Technologies become obsolete. Companies acquire other companies. Manufacturing networks consolidate. Commercial priorities shift. Sometimes a product returns to internal manufacturing. Sometimes it moves to another CDMO. Sometimes it simply reaches the end of its commercial life. Yet we spend remarkably little time discussing what a good ending looks like. Perhaps that is because partnership language encourages us to imagine permanence, but a strategic relationship does not have to last forever to be successful. It has to create value while it exists and end without unnecessary damage. That requires honesty long before the final purchase order.
Sponsors should communicate material changes in portfolio direction as early as reasonably possible, respect contractual commitments, and provide sufficient time for workforce, capacity, inventory, and technology-transfer planning. CDMOs should maintain quality, service, and professionalism even when future revenue is declining. Both sides should resist the temptation to reinterpret every disagreement through the lens of an impending separation. And sponsors should never manufacture a performance narrative to disguise a decision driven by economics or network strategy.
There is no shame in saying that a product no longer fits the manufacturing network. There is considerable damage in pretending the decision was something else. A well-managed exit should include clear ownership of inventory disposition, technical documentation, regulatory responsibilities, transition milestones, outstanding commercial obligations, and supply continuity. It should also include an honest assessment of what the relationship achieved and what both organizations could have done differently.
The relationship may end, but reputations do not. This is a relatively small industry. People change companies. Leaders become customers, suppliers, colleagues, and competitors again. A CDMO that feels abandoned during a difficult transition will remember. So will a sponsor whose supplier stopped caring the moment the final product transfer was announced.
How you leave a supplier is part of your supplier strategy. And the way an organization behaves at the end of a relationship may be the clearest evidence of whether it was ever genuinely strategic.
The next frontier: From supplier management to mutual accountability
The industry’s external manufacturing model has evolved enormously. We have become more sophisticated in supplier segmentation, procurement analytics, quality oversight, network design, and commercial contracting. But sophistication in measurement does not automatically translate into maturity in relationships.
Consider the uncomfortable paradox. We want CDMOs to invest in capacity without guaranteed returns, deliver flexibility without charging for uncertainty, disclose risks before they materialize, maintain flawless quality, and remain committed when volumes decline. At the same time, sponsors may provide unstable forecasts, slow decisions, fragmented communication, and contracts that reward little beyond baseline compliance. Then we wonder why the relationship feels transactional. The answer is not to abandon commercial discipline or substitute goodwill for accountability. It is to recognize that accountability must be reciprocal.
The next generation of strategic outsourcing will require sponsors and CDMOs to make five commitments.
They must:
- Define strategic importance separately from strategic behavior
- Write contracts that reward verified value creation, not merely punish failure
- Measure relationship health alongside operational performance
- Accept responsibility for their own contribution to supplier outcomes
- Manage the end of relationships with the same professionalism they bring at the start
There is a final reason this matters beyond procurement economics. Pharmaceutical manufacturing is not an ordinary supply chain. Behind every forecast, batch record, deviation investigation, and shipment is a patient who depends on the system working.
That does not eliminate the need for profit. A sustainable manufacturing network requires financially healthy sponsors and CDMOs. But it changes how we should think about the purpose of partnership. The ultimate objective is not to win the negotiation. It is to build a manufacturing system capable of delivering medicines reliably through uncertainty, disagreement, disruption, and change. Perhaps the most important question is no longer, “How do we get more from our CDMOs?” Perhaps it is, “What would become possible if both sides were equally committed to making the other successful?” That is the difference between a supplier relationship and a strategic alliance. And it is a difference the pharmaceutical industry can no longer afford to treat as semantics.
Dan Marasco is a biopharmaceutical supply chain, strategic sourcing, and external manufacturing leader with nearly 30+ years of experience across Merck, Bristol Myers Squibb, Takeda, Phibro and Biogen. The viewpoints in this article are his own and do not represent those of current or former employers and draws on his professional experience and the themes explored during the panel discussion on the topic of Strategic Procurement: Building Win-Win CDMO Alliances Beyond Price at CDMO Live Americas 2026 in Boston, MA.